

The Eternal Functional Subordination of the Son Disproved Through a Synthesis of the Nature, Decree, and Work of God

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As in much of life, the areas of theology which promise the most fruit also demand the most care and industry. Augustine remarks concerning the Trinity that "...in no other subject is error more dangerous, or inquiry more laborious, or the discovery of truth more profitable."¹ Bavinck notes similarly that "...in the confession of the Trinity we hear the heartbeat of the Christian religion: every error results from, or upon deeper reflection is traceable to, a departure in the doctrine of the Trinity."² If these men are correct, then the debate rising several years ago in evangelical circles concerning the "Eternal Functional Subordination of the Son" demands careful and cautious attention.

The question at the crux of this conflict was, "Is the Son in submission to the Father from all eternity, or was He only so in His human performance of the work of redemption?"³ The question was also phrased in this way: Did the eternal Son take on the form of a servant *because* of an eternal relationship of subordination to His Father, or did He do so through a free expression of His own will? Certain advocates of eternal functional subordination, such as Bruce Ware, Wayne Grudem, and John Starke,⁴ argue that this is so—with the stipulation that this does not imply an ontological subordination

1. Augustine of Hippo, "On the Trinity," in *The Complete Ante-Nicene, Nicene and Post-Nicene Collection of Early Church Fathers: Cross-Linked to the Bible*, ed. Philip Schaff, Kindle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 80172.

2. Herman Bavinck, *Reformed Dogmatics*, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 2:288.

3. Bruce A. Ware and John Starke, *One God in Three Persons: Unity of Essence, Distinction of Persons, Implications for Life* (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2015), 137.

4. See Luke Stamps, "The New Evangelical Subordinationism? Perspectives on the Equality of God the Father and God the Son," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 59, no. 4 (December 2016): 874.

of the Son to the Father.⁵ Others, such as Liam Goligher and Carl Trueman, have argued that, despite their protestations, Ware and Grudem's position necessarily demands an ontological subordination within the Trinity.⁶

As a subordination in essence falls outside the bounds of orthodoxy, this accusation should be taken with gravity. In opposition to the proponents of the eternal functional subordination of the Son, this paper argues the second Person of the Trinity does the will of His Father in the economy of salvation voluntarily, as rooted in the decree of the *pactum salutis*. This will be proved by a synthesis of three areas: the basic Trinitarian concepts of Person and essence, the interplay of Person and essence in the *pactum salutis*, and the work of the three Persons in redemption.

The Nature of God

In order to properly address the question of the eternal functional subordination of the Son, some orthodox foundations of Trinitarian theology are necessary. Particularly, there must be an understanding of the divine Persons, the divine essence, and the divine will. The scriptures teach three Persons working as a unity in one divine essence, but how do we speak of this reality definitionally and relationally?

Regarding His essence, Calvin describes God as “simple and undivided,”⁷ and Augustine as that to which “being” most truly belongs, containing no accidents or potentialities for change.⁸ À Brakel describes the divine essence as “one, and non-relational.”⁹ The term *person* derives from the Latin form of the Greek word

5. The debate of 2016 involved also social questions concerning the Son's eternal subordination to the Father, and its implications for husband-wife relationships. This paper will not address those issues.

6. See Alastair Roberts, “The Eternal Subordination of the Son Controversy: The Debate so Far,” Reformation21 Blog, n.d., <http://www.reformation21.org/blog/2016/06/the-eternal-subordination-of-t.php> (accessed April 30, 2019). See also Michael F. Bird and Robert Shillaker, “Subordination in the Trinity and Gender Roles: A Response to Recent Discussion,” *Trinity Journal* 29, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 269.

7. John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Kindle, 2006. (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 4253.

8. Augustine of Hippo, “On the Trinity,” 82293.

9. Wilhelmus à Brakel, *The Christian's Reasonable Service*, ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Bartel Elshout (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2012), 1:146.

hypostasis and refers to what Calvin describes as a “subsistence,” or Bavinck as “subjects,”¹⁰ in the divine essence. Calvin describes each subsistence in the Godhead as that which “has been joined with the [divine] essence by a common bond and cannot be separated from it, yet has a special mark whereby it is distinguished from it.”¹¹ Further, the Father, Son, and Spirit are different subsistences in the same divine essence, but each possesses an “incommunicable quality” which distinguishes Him from the others. “[W]hatever is proper to each individually,” he says, “I maintain to be incommunicable because whatever is attributed to the Father as a distinguishing mark cannot agree with, or be transferred to, the Son.”¹²

According to Calvin, then, the divine Persons are differentiated from the divine essence by a “special mark,” and are differentiated among themselves by a distinguishing mark or “incommunicable quality.” This language does seem to intimate that the Persons have something in them which the divine essence does not, but, as Gerald Bray notes, this is not Calvin’s intention. Rather, “the persons are not separable from the essence, because they reside in it...the heart of Calvin’s teaching was that the essence of God is not perceivable as such [as essence], but can be discerned only as the predicate of each of the three persons.”¹³ Similarly, but even more strongly, Richard of St. Victor argued that “a ‘divine person’ is nothing else than an ‘incommunicable existence.’”¹⁴

Augustine chose to distinguish the three Persons according to their relations. He argued in this way: Because there can be no accidents in the essence of God, and in each Person is all of God’s essence,¹⁵ the persons may not possess accidents.¹⁶ Therefore, they

10. Bavinck, *Reformed Dogmatics*, 2:305.

11. Calvin, *Institutes*, 4367.

12. Calvin, *Institutes*, 4367.

13. Gerald Lewis Bray, *The Doctrine of God, Contours of Christian Theology* (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1993), 223.

14. D. Glenn Butner, “Eternal Functional Subordination and the Problem of the Divine Will,” *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 58, no. 1 (March 2015): 141. He states also that “John Owen affirmed the will as a property of nature, teaching, “The wisdom, the understanding of God, the will of God, the immensity of God, is in that person, not as that person, but as the person is God.”

15. Joel R. Beeke and Paul M. Smalley, *Reformed Systematic Theology* (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2019), 1: 909–10.

16. Augustine of Hippo, “On the Trinity,” 82337.

must be distinguished by their relations, not their attributes. Augustine described it this way: “The Father is not called the Father except in that He has a Son, and the Son is not called Son except in that He has a Father, these things are not said according to substance; because each of them is not so called in relation to Himself, but the terms are used reciprocally and in relation each to the other; nor yet according to accident, because both the being called the Father, and the being called the Son, is eternal and unchangeable to them.”¹⁷ As Bavinck summarizes him: “The distinction between the persons cannot arise from attributes or accidents that one person has in distinction from another, but stems from the interpersonal relations of the members of the Trinity.”¹⁸

Regardless of how the Persons are defined, there must, Calvin stipulates, be something which differentiates the Father from the Son and from the Spirit. As à Brakel puts it, “The same essence in its entirety is present in all three Persons; however, each Person has his own independent personality.”¹⁹ He argues that it is not proper to speak of their differences as differences in work or function, but rather “this distinction relates to the very nature of these Persons. It is God’s eternal nature to exist as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the Father not being able to be the Son, and the Holy Spirit not being able to be the Father.”²⁰

À Brakel proceeds to lay out five ways in which the Persons are differentiated in Scripture. First, in regard to their personal properties: the Father generates the Son, the Son is generated by the Father, and the Spirit is sent by the Father and Son. These personal properties are “foundational to the interpersonal relationship, and . . . the basis for our distinction.”²¹ Second, in the Scripture giving each Person different names: the Father, Son, and Spirit cannot be identical, for their very names are differences. Third, in the order the Persons are placed in—a first, second, and third. Fourth, in manner of existence: “the Father is of Himself, the Son is of the Father, and the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son.”²² And fifth, in manner of operation

17. Augustine of Hippo, “On the Trinity,” 82338–82341.

18. Bavinck, *Reformed Dogmatics*, 2:286.

19. à Brakel, *The Christian’s Reasonable Service*, 1:146.

20. à Brakel, *The Christian’s Reasonable Service*, 1:146–47.

21. à Brakel, *The Christian’s Reasonable Service*, 1:146.

22. à Brakel, *The Christian’s Reasonable Service*, 1:146–47.

as the “Father works of Himself, the Son is engaged on behalf of His Father, and the Holy Spirit on behalf of both.”²³ The divine Persons, à Brakel emphatically states, must necessarily be unique while at the same time being the one, simple, divine essence. Gerald Bray summarizes the heritage of Calvin and the Reformation concerning Trinitarian unity and diversity in this way: “The incommunicable attributes constitute the absolute, divine essence, which is his unity: the communicable attributes come together in the pattern of divine relations by which we see the model of the divine society, and experience, by our adoption as sons and daughters of God in the image of Christ, the reality of fellowship in the inner life of the Holy Trinity.”²⁴

Beeke and Smalley similarly note the necessity for differences in the three Persons, stating particularly that the order within the Persons of the Trinity is not “a chronological order, as if one Person existed when the others did not, or an ontological order, as if one Person had more or greater attributes than another, or more glory and dignity than another, but a personal order that shapes how the Persons relate to each other and how they work together in the world.”²⁵ This language of differentiation is reflected also by the Westminster divines: “These three are one true, eternal God, the same in substance, equal in power and glory; although distinguished by their personal properties.”²⁶

Given this uniqueness of each Person, how does the divine will work? The Third Council of Constantinople stated clearly that will must be a property of nature and not of personhood. If the will were a property of personhood, then the second Person of the Trinity could not have said “not my will, but thine” in Gethsemane, for this would imply a disagreement in the one divine will. If those words, however, are the expression of Christ’s human nature, there is no contradiction.²⁷ The will then must reside in the nature (divine, human) of the Person. The three Persons of the Trinity then do not have three wills, but rather one will expressed in or through three Persons. This oneness of will is corroborated by the Persons’ singularity of purpose manifest in all the Scriptures. No one divine Person works alone and

23. à Brakel, *The Christian’s Reasonable Service*, 1:146–47.

24. Bray, *The Doctrine of God*, 224.

25. Beeke and Smalley, *Reformed Systematic Theology*, 1:891.

26. Westminster Larger Catechism Q&A 9.

27. Bray, *The Doctrine of God*, 179.

for His own purposes,²⁸ yet each is unique and does work which no other Person does. The Father did not die on the cross, and the Son did not send Himself. The Son did become incarnate, but does not, properly speaking, regenerate us. All three work in tandem, with one identical goal. The three divine Persons must then in their unique relations and works give expressions of the one divine will which are unique and yet entirely complementary to each other.

The Decree of God

How does this understanding of Persons, essence, and will inform our understanding of the decrees of God, particularly the *pactum salutis*? In what way did the three Persons covenant together to save the elect to the eternal glory of God the Father, Son, and Spirit? First, the Father, Son, and Spirit did not enter the *pactum salutis* as exactly identical Persons who just happened to freely will to take on different “roles” for the accomplishment of redemption. The Father is uniquely the Father, and always has been; similarly so, the Son and Spirit. Some who strive to promote an equality among the Persons do so at the expense of making each effectively identical, aside from their roles or works. They fear that difference demands inequality of status or difference in ontology. À Brakel comments regarding his differentiation of the Persons by their names that “[t]o maintain that the three Names have no significance beyond the names themselves, or to maintain that these names merely refer to God’s administration of the covenant of grace, is nothing less than a denial of the Holy Trinity.”²⁹ Each Person must be able to possess different qualities or characteristics without any difference in status or ontology.

Second, it must be asserted that the *pactum salutis* was not formed by God out of ontological necessity. Just as He was not compelled by His ontology to create, but rather freely willed to create all things, so He was in no way compelled to enter a covenant to redeem fallen mankind. Rather, out of His own free will, God decreed to save all His elect among mankind and to do so by means of an inter-trinitarian covenant of grace directed toward mankind.³⁰

28. Augustine states, relatedly, that “the working of both the Father and the Son is indivisible and equal, but it is from the Father to the Son.” Augustine of Hippo, “On the Trinity,” 80755.

29. à Brakel, *The Christian’s Reasonable Service*, 1:147–48.

30. As Bavinck put it, “The counsel of God is to be understood as his eternal

Third, just as God was not compelled by His nature to enter into covenant to save man, so the three Persons in their expression of the divine free will were in no way compelled to compact with each other in the manner in which they did.³¹ The Father was not compelled to compact with the Son and Spirit to be the architect of salvation and sender of His Son and Spirit, nor was the Son compelled to be the sent one or to send the Spirit, nor was the Spirit compelled to be the one sent from the Father and Son. All three freely chose in accordance with the one, free divine will that each would work in His particular way. The Father, Son, and Spirit willed with equal authority, power, freedom, and desire that the Father send the Son, that the Son be sent by the Father, and that the Spirit be sent by both the Father and the Son. The ontology of the Father as the begetting one, and of the Son as the begotten one, and of the Spirit as the proceeding one did not dictate or demand³² that the Father be the one who sends, nor that the Son be the one who was sent.

If the Son had been the sent one because of His ontology,³³ He would have only been doing that which was necessary to His nature, and His glory would be diminished. The Son would have been a servant by nature, and to do His Father's bidding in accomplishing the humbling work of salvation would have been a necessity. The Son must rather have freely willed to do this work such that the salvation of the elect is merited by Him, and that the glory of all heaven suitable for such a work be reflected back on Him. It is the voluntary nature of this submission which brings such glory to Christ. Christina Larsen quotes Jonathan Edwards as saying that the economic working of the Trinity "is neither eternal nor a necessary emanation from the level of procession but is initiated by a 'mutual free agreement.'"

While "the persons of the Trinity all consent to this order, and establish it by agreement, as they all naturally delight in what is in itself fit, suitable and beautiful" because "decency requires

plan for all that exists or will happen in time. This decree must be distinguished from its execution in time as well as from God himself. God is not identical with his decree; his self-knowledge is not exhausted in creation, providence, and redemption." Bavinck, *Reformed Dogmatics*, 2:39.

31. By the word "compelled" I mean "coerced" or "forced to do something against one's will."

32. Dictate, demand, or "compel."

33. Or, "if the Son was compelled by His ontology to be the sent one."

it,” it remains an ordering that is freely willed by all three divine persons insofar as none is necessarily subject to another in either will or act: “It is not proper to say decency obliges the persons of the Trinity to come into this order.”³⁴

Further, we can think of it in relation to the Cappadocian principle that “If we claim to know God as he truly is, we have to believe that God dwells in himself in the same way that he reveals himself to us, that is, according to the same pattern of relationships.”³⁵ Kevin Giles states similarly that “the Bible is predicated on the principle that what God does reveals who God is. Being and function in God are one.”³⁶ These assertions are appropriate, but only if a difference is made between how God *does* work and how God *must* work. There is a true reflection of God’s *ad extra* workings upon His *ad intra* realities, but His works do not tell us how He *must* work. In other words, God’s workings tell us how the three Persons have decreed to work, but they do not tell us that the three Persons work this way by ontological necessity.³⁷

This brings us to the fourth assertion concerning the *pactum salutis*, namely, that although each Person entered into this covenant of grace freely, there was a suitability between what they freely chose and who they were by nature.³⁸ Although their ontology in no way dictated

34. Christina N. Larsen, “Jonathan Edwards and Eternal Generation,” in *Retrieving Eternal Generation*, ed. Fred Sanders and Scott R. Swain (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 214–15.

35. Bray, *The Doctrine of God*, 160.

36. Kevin Giles, “Response to Michael Bird and Robert Shillaker: The Son Is Not Eternally Subordinated in Authority to the Father,” *Trinity Journal* 30, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 245.

37. Bavinck remarks in this regard that “Scripture knows nothing of a divine essence that can be discovered and known by the powers of the human intellect apart from revelation. It posits no split, much less a contrast, between God’s ontological existence and his ‘economic’ self-revelation. As God reveals himself, so is He.” Bavinck, *Reformed Dogmatics*, 2:111. This is slightly different from the approach I am attempting to formulate. I am arguing that God’s economic revelation tells us how He freely chooses to work, not how He is required to act by nature of His being. If He was required to act out what He is, this would do violence to the very nature of a free will; His decrees would become a necessity by ontology. Not that He acts in a way inconsistent with His character, but rather that He is not compelled to act as He acts, but does so out of a free will.

38. See also the formulation found in Michael F. Bird and Robert Shillaker, “The Son Really, Really Is the Son: A Response to Kevin Giles,” *Trinity Journal* 30, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 261.

their choices, their choices reflected beautifully back on their unique Persons. The Son's choice to be sent by the Father was appropriate to His being the One described by Scripture as eternally "from" or "of" the Father. His eternal "begottenness" or "generation" from the Father made His choice to be the sent One fitting to His ontology. Further, His nature as being the One from whom the Spirit proceeded made it fitting for Him to freely will that He be not only sent of the Father, but also sender of the Spirit. Similarly, the Father's choice to be the sender was entirely fitting given His nature. As the One from whom the Son was begotten, and from whom the Spirit also proceeded, it was appropriate that He be the one who sent both His Son and His Spirit.³⁹ Therefore, although freedom of will was and is the Father's, Son's, and Spirit's, in their free expressions of the divine will they freely chose a role in the covenant of redemption fitting to their being.⁴⁰

In summary, the *pactum salutis* was formed between three unique, equally powerful and equally authoritative Persons who freely expressed the numerically one divine will such that the Father willed freely to send the Son, the Son willed freely to be sent and to send, and the Spirit willed freely to be sent. These free choices by the three Persons were in no way dictated by their ontology, and yet the Father's role of sending and lack of being sent was fitting to His nature as the begetter and unbegotten One, the Son's role of being sent and sending was fitting to His nature of being begotten and being proceeded from, and the Spirit's role of being sent was fitting to His nature of proceeding from the Father and Son.

The Work of God

To answer questions concerning the Son's relationship to the Father in His redemptive work, we need to examine that part of eternity "after" the *pactum salutis* and "before" the incarnation of Christ. How

39. This is different from the sentiment expressed by Bird and Shillaker, that "Jesus' submission to his Father tells us something of the eternal life of God." Bird and Shillaker, as other EFS supporters, are reflecting Christ's human submission back into His divine will.

40. Beeke and Smalley phrase it somewhat differently: "The Father's begetting of the Son undergirds the order of their relation, so that the Father always sends the Son to do His will and the Son never sends the Father. However, order is not subordination or inferiority in dignity or authority." Beeke and Smalley, *Reformed Systematic Theology*, 1:940.

does the Son in His divine nature relate to His Father after the freely decreed *pactum salutis*? Can we now speak of the Son as “eternally functionally subordinate” to the Father given His freely willed choice to be the sent One in this agreement? If this covenant was made from all eternity, then perhaps it is proper to speak of the Son as eternally functionally subordinate? How we answer this question will also dictate our answer to how Christ in His divine nature relates to the Father in glory after His second coming and into all future eternity. The following propositions will answer these questions. First, there is only one will in the Godhead. Second, sending and going lie as fully in the will of the Son as they do in the will of the Father. Third, the verses speaking of Christ’s submission refer to His human nature.

First, the Son cannot be eternally functionally subordinated to the Father due to there being only one will in the Godhead. By its very nature, human submission or subordination demands a difference in wills in which one person’s will is moved by the other’s.⁴¹ This analogy of authority and submission could only be reflected back into the Trinity if each divine Person possessed His own will.⁴² As the will is a property of nature, and there is only one nature in the Godhead, the word cannot apply to the eternal Father-Son-Spirit relationship in the way humans use it. Given this, we cannot say that the divine Son “submits” to the Father, eternally or otherwise.⁴³

Second, the Son wills to be sent with the same and equal power, authority, and desire as the Father wills that the Son be sent. In His

41. Letham rightly notes this when he says that “the language of subordination entails that the one subordinated has no choice but is subjected by his superior. The subject of active forms of the verb ‘to subordinate’ subordinates another. This could hardly be the case in the Trinity. It was typical of the Arian heresy.” Ware and Starke, *One God in Three Persons*, 122.

42. With Glenn Butner, the claim (of P. T. Forsyth) that the “Son has a ‘yielding will’ and the Father an ‘exigent will’ remains unclear.” We cannot speak of two wills, and if he is speaking of two expressions of the same will, how can he speak of “yielding.” The terminology of “yielding” implies an initial resistance which is impossible within a singular will. Butner, “Eternal Functional Subordination and the Problem of the Divine Will,” 137–38.

43. Christopher Cowan comes almost halfway to this position when he states, “it is a false dichotomy to set Jesus’s unity of will with the Father in opposition to his obedience to his Father. To speak of one’s ‘obedience’ or ‘submission’ to God’s command does not imply any necessary lack of unity of will between the two as if the one obeying God does so only under protest!” Ware and Starke, *One God in Three Persons*, 58.

divine nature, the Son is not in the smallest way unwilling to be sent; rather, He wills with as much strength and efficacy that the Father send Him as does the Father. He wills with the same divine will as His Father's that He come and do His Father's work. The same divine will expressed in the Father's sending is expressed in the Son's going. To use a human analogy, the Father's will and the Son's will are as two sides of one coin. They are not different, cannot be separated, possess the same weight, but yet are different expressions.⁴⁴ Instead of using language of an eternal "subordination," it would be better to speak of the Son as eternally and freely willing to do whatever the Father has willed that He do. Using this language, the one divine will expressed by and in the Father says to the Son, "Go," and that same divine will expressed by and in the Son says to the Father, "I come to do thy will, O God."

Lastly, much of the confusion surrounding the eternal functional submission of the Son can be cleared away using the classical distinction between the divine and human natures of the Son of God. It is proper to speak of the human nature of Christ always remaining in submission to the divine will of the Father, from His incarnation and onwards into eternity. It is not proper to speak of the divine nature of Christ being in submission to the Father, for reasons already mentioned. Most texts speaking of Christ's submission to His Father are easily and properly interpreted if this is understood.⁴⁵ In His divine nature, there was no tension with the divine will, for there was only

44. On the note of human analogies, care should be taken when using the human father-son analogy to speak of the divine Father-Son relationship. It must both contain the correct elements and be properly limited. Often, those advocating the eternal functional subordination of the Son use examples in which the son is younger and under his father's care and authority. This is not appropriate for multiple reasons, including the Son's co-eternality with the Father. Rather, the human father-son relationship used in analogy should not speak of a young, immature, or still maturing and under authority son, but of a fully matured son, with full personal authority, "dependent" only in the sense that his origin was in his parents. This human son has his source of life from within himself, an authority of his own equal to his father's, and a will that is his own. The human analogy, of course, breaks down in every area. But, if it is going to be used, it should be done with the proper elements.

45. Anselm provides some clarity here: "Christ himself of his own volition underwent death in order to save mankind." "That particular man, Christ, owed this obedience to God his Father, and his humanity owed it to his divinity." Jesus in his humanity owed obedience to Father and Son. "Christ, therefore, did not come to do his will, but the will of his Father, because the just desire that He had did not

one will. In His human nature, the Son's human will was upheld and sustained by the divine will such that Christ truly chose to live without sin and die on the cross. The human nature of Christ then by this very upholding of the divine nature submitted to the divine will, and so will continue to do through all eternity. It is in this way that we can understand Christ saying, "Not my will, but thine." In this submission of the human to the divine will lay the salvation of man. To say, then, that the Son of God in eternity past, prior to taking on a human nature, was submissive to God is to completely miss the significance of Christ's taking on and redeeming human nature by bringing it under subjection to the divine and good will of God.

Conclusion

Although the doctrine of the eternal functional subordination of the Son may appear at surface level to be a biblical doctrine, the orthodox doctrines of the oneness of the divine will possessed by three unique but complementary Persons, together with an understanding of the *pactum salutis* and its outworking in God's trinitarian works of redemption, leave the doctrine without a proper footing. Positing an eternal subordination implies a difference in wills, and thus controversy within God. Further, its eternity implies an inferiority of freedom within the Son which, given the will's location in the divine essence, must imply an ontological inferiority. Although all Christians to some extent or other live with "blessed inconsistencies" between their head, heart, and life, evangelical Christendom would do well here to maintain consistent, orthodox Trinitarian doctrine. Although "God...exists more truly than He is thought,"⁴⁶ theologians of our day must in continuity with faithful generations of the past put up the boundary walls outside of which God's Word does not permit us to tread.

come from his humanity but from his divinity." Butner, "Eternal Functional Subordination and the Problem of the Divine Will," 140–41.

46. Augustine of Hippo, "On the Trinity," 82950.

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